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PARI PASSU CLAUSES AND THE
SKEUOMORPH PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD†
When sophisticated parties bargain with each other, they should
negotiate terms that work to their mutual benefit. They should prevent
bad clauses from entering transactions and rid themselves of those that
might cause trouble. Doing anything else leaves money on the table.
This line of thought lies at the bedrock of many modern accounts of
contract, and we have grown quite comfortable with it. Perhaps too
comfortable. Through their exploration of pari passu clauses,
Professors Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott, and their many co-authors
have forced us to have second thoughts.1 In a market with highly
sophisticated players, a clause that serves no apparent purpose and is a
source of considerable mischief has persisted for decades.
Of course, there are circumstances in which suboptimal contract
terms might emerge. Some markets may have too few sophisticated
buyers. Reputational forces do not necessarily prevent advantagetaking, especially if there is little repeat dealing. Sellers may be able to
Copyright © 2017 Douglas G. Baird.
† Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I
thank Brent Yarnell for valuable research assistance, and I am particularly grateful to Mitu Gulati
for his characteristically gracious and thoughtful comments. The Frank Greenberg Fund and the
John M. Olin Fund provided generous research support.
1. This revolutionary work is a most happy partnership between Mitu Gulati and Robert
E. Scott, respectively, the person whose pioneering work has made sovereign debt a focal point
of academic discourse, and the person who has defined the cutting edge of contracts scholarship
in each of the last five decades. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF
MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2012). Gulati
and Scott’s excellent paper with Stephen J. Choi is the focal point of this essay. It finds them
joined with someone whose empirical skills in law and finance are second to none. See Stephen J.
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67
DUKE L.J. 1 (2017).
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exploit cognitive biases.2 But none of these qualifications apply to the
trillion-dollar sovereign debt market, a sandbox in which only adults
play and in which the dollar amounts are large enough to get anyone’s
attention. A pari passu clause is like a clock that strikes thirteen. It is a
puzzle in its own right and puts much else in doubt as well.
A natural approach to the pari passu puzzle is to look for the
clause’s closest cousins. One might search for other contract terms that
persist even though they serve little or no purpose. For example, many
contracts contain an “ipso facto” clause. It terminates the contract in
the event one of the parties files for bankruptcy. Such clauses have
been unenforceable since 1978,3 but they remain standard boilerplate
nevertheless.4 A catalogue of such clauses might help explain why
clauses that serve no apparent function become lodged in commercial
boilerplate and remain there.
In this short essay, however, I take a different tack. Before
narrowing the focus to contract terms, it is useful to ask whether similar
phenomena can be observed with respect to other product attributes.
Contract terms are merely one type of product feature. A more
generous warranty increases the value of a computer in the same way
that a bigger screen does. Every product bundles features like large
screens and warranties together. On the face of it, there is nothing
special about contract terms. Market forces should work with respect
to all product attributes in the same way.5
Regardless of whether it is a contract term or something else, it
would seem that a product feature that comes at a cost, serves no
purpose, and is not even understood by consumers should not take
hold and persist, at least not in competitive markets between
sophisticated actors. The forces of a competitive market should
eradicate such features, regardless of whether they are contract terms
or physical attributes. But it turns out that this is not the case. There
are many examples outside of contract law and they come in different
flavors.

2. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1409–10 (2004).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 365(e), 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2012).
4. See DAVID ZARFES & MICHAEL L. BLOOM, CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 299–300 (2011) (discussing prevalence of “ipso facto” clauses that make
bankruptcy an event of default and noting that these are commonly included in contracts).
5. For an excellent essay in the same spirit that connects the production of contracts with
the production of ordinary goods, see Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 77, 79 (2011).
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A pari passu clause is what is known as a “skeuomorph.”6 A
skeuomorph is one of the types of product features that persist even
though they serve no function and are potentially costly. A
skeuomorph’s defining feature is that it is adapted from a previous
version of the product where it did serve a purpose.7 Examples of
skeuomorphs outside the context of contracts are exceedingly well
documented and span all of human history.8 This essay links this
literature to pari passu clauses. To begin, however, it explores the more
general phenomenon of the persistence of undesirable product
attributes even in the face of strong competitive forces.
I. IMPERFECT GOODS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Contractual undertakings are one part of the bundle that comes
with anything purchased in the marketplace.9 A personal computer has
many different features. It has a screen of a particular size, its battery
has a certain life, and the chips have a designated speed. There is also
a great deal of software, starting with the code that comes embedded
on the chips themselves. And there are various contract terms.
The typical consumer is going to be aware of some of the features
of the product she buys, but not of others. The typical consumer knows
something about size and resolution of the computer screen, but may
know little about the speed of the chips. She may know little or nothing
about software and other pieces of intellectual property. The same is
true with various promises and undertakings included in the contract.
The consumer may know something about the warranty. For example,
she might have separately purchased a service contract, which is merely

6. The idea that skeuomorphs include contract clauses among their number does not seem
to have been noted before. A Westlaw search shows that the term itself has been used only four
times in law review articles, in each instance to talk about their use in computer interfaces. See,
e.g., Aaron E. Ghirardelli, Rules of Engagement in the Conflict Between Businesses and
Consumers in Online Contracts, 93 OR. L. REV. 719, 732 (2015) (“Apple gently guided its users to
learn how to operate a smartphone with touch screens by using skeuomorphic design.”).
7. A skeuomorph is “[a]n object or feature which imitates the design of a similar artefact
made from another material,” or, specifically in the technology context, “[a]n element of a
graphical user interface which mimics a physical object.” Skeuomorph, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017).
8. Although the phenomenon was observed long before, the word “skeuomorph” first
appears in H. Colley March, The Meaning of Ornament; or Its Archaeology and Its Psychology, 7
TRANSACTIONS LANCASHIRE & CHESHIRE ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 160, 166 (1889). For a more
recent discussion, see Robert Adam, Tin Gods: Technology and Contemporary Architecture,
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN, Oct. 1989, at 15.
9. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 124–27 (2013).
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an extended warranty by another name. But there are going to be other
terms that she knows nothing about, such as whether the form contract
contains an arbitration clause.
Many of the contract terms that are close to the hearts of law
professors—such as mandatory arbitration clauses—may simply be no
more important to the typical consumer than the technical details of a
computer’s operating system. Neither has an effect on the amount she
is willing to pay. But it is a mistake to think that contract terms are
immune to competitive pressures merely because most individuals do
not know about them.
The typical individual consumer may be insensitive to the
presence or absence of particular contract terms just as she is
insensitive to many other product features. Nevertheless, when
markets are competitive, sellers care intensely about attracting the
customer who is just on the cusp of buying somewhere else. The
consumer that matters is the one at the margin, and the marginal
consumer makes a trade-off. In contrast to the typical consumer, the
consumer at the margin weighs the value to her of a particular contract
term, a chip with a certain speed, or any other product attribute on the
one hand, and the higher price that the seller will demand if she offers
it on the other.10
The typical layperson will not notice small changes in price, but
such changes matter because of the behavior of the consumer at the
margin. Inferior products should sell for a lower price. If a product is
being sold with a feature that serves no purpose and is costly, the
marginal consumer is likely to notice and lower the price that she is
willing to pay accordingly. Someone can make money by offering the
same product without that feature and charging the same amount. In a
market in which goods have suboptimal product features, opportunity
beckons. There are, of course, situations in which markets fail, but
when the stakes are high enough and the parties sophisticated enough,
product features that serve no function and are costly should not
persist. Their existence is an opportunity for someone to make
money.11

10. This is not to say, however, that regulation is inappropriate when marginal consumers
drive sellers towards clauses that are in consumers’ interests. It may, for example, be important
to ban arbitration clauses even when rational consumers would not bargain for that outcome. See
id. at 136–40.
11. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 636–39 (1979).
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A useless product feature in a computer that makes the computer
even a little more likely to fail or a little harder to repair should not
persist. For the same reason, a clause that serves no purpose should not
survive either. For all the reasons that Choi, Gulati, and Scott have
suggested, competitive forces should force out pari passu clauses.12
Capital markets are global. Someone issuing a bond or any other
security who offers suboptimal terms should not be able to raise capital
on terms as favorable as she could if she provided better terms.
Issuers of sovereign debt should offer terms that work to the
mutual benefit of borrower and lender. Both are interested in ensuring
that debt can be restructured when the sovereign encounters financial
reverses and finds itself unable to pay what it owes.13 A bond that could
not be restructured when the creditors as a group wanted it to be
restructured should be less attractive and carry a higher interest rate.
A sovereign that is not able to repay a debt in full, but that is able to
repay 30 cents on the dollar, is more likely to repay something if the
debt can be restructured. It is therefore odd that sovereign debt
offerings regularly include an obstacle to restructuring such as a pari
passu clause that has no offsetting benefit.
To be sure, the costs of a pari passu clause are not large relative to
the total amount of sovereign debt. The pari passu clause matters only
if there is a default, and rates of default are quite low. Those who buy
and sell sovereign bonds are going to spend much more time trying to
estimate the risk of default than evaluating the risk of a term that
operates only in the wake of a default. Nevertheless, in a trillion-dollar
market, even the smallest effects translate into real money. The
litigation over pari passu clauses alone has likely consumed tens of
millions of dollars in legal fees. All of these are deadweight losses.
But one should not overstate the power of market forces with
respect to either pari passu clauses or any other product attribute. To
say that the forces of competition push parties towards the Pareto
frontier is not to say that they are powerful enough to eliminate all

12. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 58 (“Contract theory predicts that contract drafters will
revise standard contract terms when faced with an interpretation adverse to their clients’
interests.” (footnote omitted)).
13. It is possible to argue that a sovereign might deliberately make restructuring of bonds
hard. Although costly ex post, making restructuring hard might serve as a commitment device. By
ensuring that difficulties in bad states of the world are costly, the borrower gives itself an incentive
to ensure that it never finds itself in them. This is a clever argument. Too clever. As Choi, Gulati,
and Scott explain, this potential justification for pari passu clauses is inconsistent with the way
pari passu clauses vary across different types of borrowers.
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imperfection. To the contrary, if the pressure of competition were so
powerful that buyers paid attention to every variation in product
quality, markets as we know them could not exist.
Instead of pari passu clauses, consider another environment where
the forces of competition are unusually strong—a commodities market.
Even here, competition does not ensure uniformity. Indeed, a
commodities market depends upon classification and standardization.14
It is not possible to have a market where commodities sell at a readily
ascertainable price if each bag of corn or bushel of wheat comes from
a different farmer and varies in quality. Once a system for assessing the
quality of corn comes into being, corn from each farm can be graded
and then stored with other corn of the same grade. To work effectively,
however, buyers and sellers in a commodities market must be willing
to buy and sell any corn that is graded No. 2 at the same price. This is
possible only if buyers and sellers do not take into account variations
in quality within each grade.
There are, however, always variations in quality within each grade,
even with respect to ordinary commodities like corn or wheat. Corn,
for example, can have anywhere between three percent and four
percent broken kernels and foreign matter and still count as No. 2
grade corn.15 One lot of corn graded No. 2 might contain only 3.3
percent broken kernels and foreign matter, while another might
contain 3.8 percent. The first lot of corn is better, but both lots are still
graded No. 2 and both trade at the same price. Under conditions of
perfect competition, this would not be possible.
Markets are designed to ensure that people in a market cannot
exploit variation in the quality of standardized goods. One cannot
make money by selling No. 2 corn that is below average quality or
buying No. 2 corn that is above average. That some costs exist to
prevent perfect sorting in the market for corn is a happy accident.16 In
other markets, more needs to be done.17
14. See WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST
114–19 (1991).
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GRAIN INSPECTION, PACKERS & STOCKYARDS ADMIN.,
FED. GRAIN INSPECTION SERV., U.S. STANDARDS: SUBPART D—UNITED STATES STANDARDS
FOR CORN 3 (Sept. 1996), https://www.gipsa.usda.gov/fgis/standards/810corn.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M7FN-NKQC].
16. In this case, the costs are those associated with inspecting individual lots and the costs of
segregating those that are above (or below) par and buying (or selling) only those lots. Such
cherry-picking is costly, and the other parties to the transaction that benefit from standardization
have no incentive to make it cheap.
17. In the wholesale diamond market, at least as it existed in the 1980s, favored buyers were
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The existence of variations within a grade for standardized
products that are traded in well-functioning markets shows that
competitive forces are not strong enough to allow even salient
variations in product quality (such as the amount of foreign matter in
a bushel of corn) to be fully reflected in the price. Commodity markets
require standardization, and standardization is not possible if
competitive forces worked entirely without friction. The existence of
commodity markets illustrates a more general point about the frictions
that exist in every market. Just as corn with different amounts of
foreign matter can trade at the same price, product features that are
suboptimal can persist as long as there are some forces in place that put
a brake on change.
The QWERTY keyboard is a good example. This keyboard is
tolerably well designed.18 The mechanical action on early typewriters
was subject to jamming. To slow the first typists—most of whom typed
with one finger—letters that commonly appear together in English
were placed on opposite sides of the keyboard. As it happens, this
configuration is a desirable attribute for touch typists. A finger on one
hand can reach for a key while a finger on the other hand is striking
another, increasing the typist’s speed. In another happy accident, the
manufacturer of the first QWERTY keyboards wanted sales people to
be able to show the machine to good advantage, and it did this by
putting all the letters for a long and salient word on a single row. (The
word was “typewriter.”) Hence, many of the most commonly used
letters found themselves on a single row. This also enhances speed.
But the QWERTY layout is not optimal. Not all of the most
common letters are on the same row, and the row with the most
common letters is not the home row where the fingers rest. As a result,
a QWERTY keyboard requires the fingers to move more than they
need to. This both reduces speed and increases fatigue.
The QWERTY keyboard, however, is good enough such that the
forces that push towards change are not sufficient to overcome the
inertia of the status quo. Given that alternative keyboards are only a

given a box (or “sight”) of diamonds of a particular grade on a take-it-or-leave-it price. A buyer
who refused to take the sight she was offered would not be invited to return. Because the
wholesaler enjoyed a cartel, it had the ability to pick and choose among potential buyers. This
arrangement prevented cherry-picking. No one could buy only sights in which the diamonds were
better on average than other sights within the same grade. See Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein,
The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON. 497, 500–02 (1983).
18. See S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16–
17 (1990).
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little better, it probably does not make sense for someone who already
knows how to type to switch. Switching keyboards requires learning to
type all over again.19 Moreover, once one switches keyboards, it is hard
to switch back.
Nor is it costless for those learning to type for the first time. In the
past, those who learned on a nonstandard keyboard risked finding their
skills useless when they found themselves in a workplace that used
QWERTY keyboards. They had to bring their own typewriters with
them. This particular obstacle has largely disappeared, as the vast
majority of typing is now done on computers. Software makes the
reconfiguration of keys easy, and touch typists do not need to look at
the physical keyboard. But even today, there are costs to being able to
type only on a nonstandard keyboard, and these are large enough to
deter all but a few people from learning to type on anything but a
QWERTY keyboard.20
The explanation for the persistence of the QWERTY keyboard is
much the same as for any other product feature that has become a
standard. If a nonstandard keyboard brought even a small
improvement in speed or reduction in fatigue for each individual typist,
the benefits across hundreds of millions of typists would be enormous.21
But the benefits to any individual typist are not large enough to
overcome the costs that a person suffers from being an outlier, and no
entrepreneur (at least none so far) has figured out a way to make
money by disrupting the equilibrium.
The same forces are at work with sovereign bonds. If no frictions
stood in the way of change, issuers of bonds that had pari passu clauses
would have to offer their investors higher yields. Because such clauses
make the bonds harder to restructure, they are offering bonds that are

19. Indeed, it may be harder to learn an alternative keyboard once one has already typed on
a QWERTY keyboard than if one has never touch-typed before. Things learned by rote are hard
to unlearn.
20. Among other things, learning materials for nonstandard keyboards are harder to come
by. Moreover, programming nonstandard keyboards for smart phones and the like is not always
easy.
21. Some have argued that no empirical case has been made for keyboards such as “Dvorak.”
See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 18, at 21 (asserting that “claims for the superiority of the
Dvorak keyboard are suspect”). But it would seem unlikely that the QWERTY keyboard would
be optimal given its design history. Even small marginal improvements that individual typists
scarcely noticed could create huge aggregate benefits. Even if an alternative keyboard were not
faster, it could be less fatiguing or put less stress on the wrists. The benefits of something as
ubiquitous as a typewriter keyboard do not have to be large for each individual for there to be
enormous social benefits.
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worth less in bad states of the world. But frictions do exist. The issuer
will not switch from selling bonds with pari passu clauses if switching
comes with costs and if individual traders will not fully incorporate the
benefits of being free of pari passu clauses into the price they are
willing to pay.
In pricing a bond, the main event is assessing the likelihood of
default. Default rates for sovereign bonds vary enormously, especially
among those that are not investment grade, the place where pari passu
clauses matter the most. To know whether a bond is being sold at a
good price, one needs to estimate the probability of default. This
probability is clouded in considerable uncertainty. The probability of a
sovereign bond default turns on an assessment of geopolitical risks that
are extremely hard to assess over a time horizon of more than two or
three years.22 This sort of variation is an order of magnitude greater
than any plausible effect of differences among bonds with various types
of pari passu clauses.
Moreover, those who buy these bonds have expertise in assessing
default risk, but considerably less expertise in assessing legal risk. In
theory, a pari passu clause reduces the value of a bond; but to know by
how much, one needs to predict when litigation might arise and how it
will be resolved. To understand how puzzling the persistence of pari
passu clauses has been, one needs to look at the ex ante costs, not the
ones incurred ex post. It would be odd to think that bond traders
thought this cost especially high when, as Choi, Gulati, and Scott show,
legal experts thought the risk low, even after two lower court opinions
suggested otherwise.23 If the experts assessing the likely outcome of
litigation in the Southern District of New York were so wrong, then
one should not expect that bond traders would gauge it accurately at
the time bonds are issued. This is especially true when, by any account,
the returns from accurately assessing default risk are so much greater
than from accurately assessing the costs of pari passu clauses.
It is worth pointing out that, in calculating its sovereign debt
ratings, S&P focuses only on the likelihood of default. It ignores the
second-order effect—recovery in the event of default. A legal risk that
affects this recovery is a third-order effect. Rating agencies care about

22. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN
WE KNOW?, at xix–xx (2017 ed.) (noting empirical finding that experts as a group do no better
than chance or simple algorithms with respect to predicting global events three years hence).
23. See Choi et al, supra note 1, at 46–50 (providing accounts of sovereign debt lawyers as to
why the pari passu clause went unmodified despite these court decisions).
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what bond buyers care about. If they do not care much about a secondorder effect, it should not be surprising that they would ignore a thirdorder effect. A bond buyer who prices bonds with different sorts of pari
passu clauses identically is acting the same way as a buyer who treats
all No. 2 corn identically.
None of this is to deny that pari passu clauses are costly and that
they would disappear if nothing counteracted the competitive
pressures.24 But, as Choi, Gulati, and Scott show, there are some forces
at work that make changing pari passu clauses just costly enough to
retard the migration towards better terms.25 They point first to legacy
costs. No one wants to put better language in a new instrument if it will
cast a bad light on previous ones from the same issuer.
In addition, the value of a sovereign bond to the issuer turns on
the willingness of those in the market to buy it on favorable terms. Two
otherwise identical sovereign bonds with different types of pari passu
clauses are like two batches of No. 2 grade corn with different amounts
of foreign matter.26 It might seem that, with millions or perhaps tens of
millions of dollars at stake, someone would demand more for a bond
with a better term. This would in turn give everyone an incentive to get
rid of terms that did not work. But, as in the case of the QWERTY
keyboard, as long as individual traders do not value the change, change
will not happen unless someone comes along and pushes the market as
a whole to accept a new standard.27
There are risks associated with buying something new. Lawyers
can explain why it is a good idea, but they are not infallible. After all,
these are the same lawyers who thought that there was little risk that
judges in the Southern District of New York would misconstrue pari
passu clauses. Trusting lawyers to draft a new and improved sovereign
debt instrument that looks unfamiliar adds a new risk and holds little
prospect for additional profit. Successful bond traders can make money
trading sovereign bonds with pari passu clauses. They have no need to
24. See id. at 59–65 (cataloguing reasons why the pari passu clause went unmodified in the
face of adverse court decisions).
25. See id., at 16 n.43.
26. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 15, at 3 (noting that corn qualifies as No. 2 grade
as long as the amount of broken kernels and foreign matter ranges between 3 and 4 percent).
27. To use Cass Sunstein’s turn of phrase, a person who brings about such a change is a
“norm entrepreneur.” The norm entrepreneur can take several different guises. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996). In the case of pari
passu clauses, change came about in part through the efforts of Gulati and Scott themselves. They
organized a conference that brought the major players together and eventually allowed them to
coalesce jointly around a new standard.
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switch. New contract language may be like New Coke. It does not
matter how good it tastes if consumers are used to the original.28
Finally, buyers of sovereign debt benefit from trading a product
that comes with a set of standard terms. They may resist better terms
even if they are better merely because they are different. Different
legal terms, even if they are better, make it harder to compare bonds.
A buyer who wants to focus on the likelihood of default across
different sovereign lenders finds it costly to account for different
contract terms at the same time. A commodity trader who is good at
predicting movements in the price of No. 2 corn is not interested in
spending time looking for corn that might be better than No. 2 corn. It
only needs to be different, regardless of whether it is better or worse,
for it to be less attractive.
Once the costs of changing a particular practice are greater than
the costs of not changing it, an imperfect product feature can persist
for a long time. Standards, once established, are hard to change. Until
recently, most people associated screw tops on wine with cheap and
corked wine bottles with expensive. You could not sell a fine wine with
a screw top even though it was a better technology.
In short, as long as recently minted 28-year-old MBAs who know
everything have a check list that tells them to ensure that some sort of
pari passu clause is in sovereign debt instruments, it will take a lot to
make them do anything else. Even when a change makes sense, it is not
likely to happen instantaneously. There is always a lag between the
time an opportunity arises and when someone takes advantage of it.
The technology needed for an overnight package delivery service
existed in the early 1960s with the introduction of small jets like the
DC-9 and the Boeing 727, but it was not until the 1970s that such
services were available.29 It takes a long time to overcome the forces
that resist change.
Contracts cannot be rewritten every time a judge makes a boneheaded decision. That pari passu clauses were a source of trouble was
not fully appreciated until the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the

28. Consumers emphatically rejected New Coke, even though most preferred it in blind taste
tests. See Gregory S. Carpenter & Kent Nakamoto, Consumer Preference Formation and
Pioneering Advantage, 26 J. MARKETING RES. 285, 297 (1989).
29. To be sure, the founder of FedEx had the idea for the business in 1965. But it was not
immediately obvious to others. Indeed, he set it out in an undergraduate term paper and received
only an average grade. See Connecting People and Possibilities: The History of FedEx, FEDEX,
http://about.van.fedex.com/our-story/history-timeline/history/ [https://perma.cc/E4DB-C5BY].
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Argentinian bond case.30 Perhaps only at this point were the benefits
of overcoming the costs of inertia large enough to justify action. And
only a few months passed from the time this happened until the time
that major actors came together and agreed on a change. The puzzle
may be not that it took so long, but that it took place so quickly.
Even if it is possible to understand why, once pari passu clauses
were part of sovereign debt instruments it was so hard to get rid of
them, there still remains the question of how useless and potentially
costly product features can take root in the first instance. I turn to this
question in the next part.
II. SKEUOMORPHS AND CONTRACT TERMS
Contract terms are not like corn. It is hard to harvest corn that
does not contain some broken kernels and foreign matter. Not so with
legal terms. There is no reason to put pointless provisions into a
contract in the first place. Benjamin Chabot and Gulati have
speculated about the particular circumstances of pari passu clauses,31
but it is again useful to connect what they observed to the more general
phenomenon of useless features entering products in the first instance.
For thousands of years, new products have replaced old ones.
Metal pointed spears replaced ones tipped with flint. Baskets made
from straw were replaced by vessels shaped from clay. Stone columns
replaced wooden ones. New products, however, often incorporate
features from old ones even when they are unnecessary. The first metal
spears had ornamentation that mimicked the hide formerly used to
bind the flint to the metal. Clay pots had ornamentation that mimicked
straw. To this day, Doric columns have triglyphs centered above each
column representing the ends of wooden beams that columns once
supported when these columns were made of wood, a practice that
more or less stopped several thousand years ago. To take a more recent
and more quotidian example, maple syrup is often sold in a glass bottle
with a small handle that serves no discernable utilitarian purpose. This
is a relic of the time when maple syrup came in jugs and the handles
were large enough to be useful. This phenomenon—of a product
feature persisting when incorporated in a new environment in which it
no longer serves a function—is well known and has a name:
30. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 201 (2013), denying cert. to
699 F.3d 246 (2012).
31. See Benjamin Chabot & Mitu Gulati, Santa Anna and His Black Eagle: The Origins of
Pari Passu?, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 216, 216–17, 235–36 (2014).
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skeuomorph.32
A pari passu clause in a sovereign debt contract is an instance of
this phenomenon. Roman and Anglo-American law have long
accepted the principle of pro-rata sharing: whenever creditors act
collectively against a common debtor, they divide whatever they collect
among themselves in proportion to the size of their claims.33 Such pari
passu provisions exist in virtually every bankruptcy statute and have
long been standard fare in agreements that creditors reach among
themselves when they pursue debtors outside of bankruptcy.
Given that such a clause is utterly common in the context of an
ordinary loan, it is not surprising that it entered into the sovereign debt
market. As Chabot and Gulati have suggested, lenders from countries
with smaller gunboats may have incorporated pari passu language
when they were writing their contracts. They might have been trying to
have the sovereign acknowledge that they should be treated the same
as lenders from countries that wielded more military power. That they
borrowed a familiar term in debtor-creditor law to serve this end is not
particularly surprising. Nor would it be unusual if pari passu language
entered sovereign debt contracts for an even less compelling reason.
Even if sovereign lending is different from ordinary lending, the
natural impulse of the lawyer, like any other craftsman, is to draw on
the familiar in crafting something new, whether it serves a useful
purpose or not.
Consumers (whether buyers of sovereign debt or anything else)
expect products to have certain characteristics merely because they
have become accustomed to them.34 Consumers never completely
understand the products that they buy. No one in the world today
possesses the human capital needed to make something even as simple

32. See March, supra note 8, at 166; supra note 7 and accompanying text.
33. It should be noted, however, that there is nothing magical about pro-rata sharing. Other,
equally coherent sharing rules also exist. See, e.g., Robert J. Aumann & Michael Maschler, Game
Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud, 36 J. ECON. THEORY 195, 198–202
(1985) (discussing the “contested-garment” rule and proving its logical coherence).
34. Once an attribute becomes part of a product, it tends to persist. In a discussion of
consumer goods, Carpenter and Nakamoto show that “in the early stages of many markets,
consumers may know little about the importance of attributes or their ideal combination” and
note that “[a] successful early entrant can have a major influence on how attributes are valued
and on the ideal attribute combination.” See Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 28, at 286.
Hence, consumers value familiar features when a product is made with a new technology or
transplanted to a new environment. This logic may be applied to financial instruments to the
extent one accepts the idea that those who acquire bonds, because they are usually not lawyers,
will not be perfectly informed about all the attributes of what they are buying.
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as an ordinary pencil from raw materials. Everyone, including buyers
of sovereign debt, must rely on heuristics and what is familiar.
Buyers of maple syrup want to see a small handle on the bottle. It
serves no purpose, but it is what consumers have come to expect. Blue
jeans are no longer made for working men who carry pocket watches,
but buyers of blue jeans want a watch pocket all the same, even though
they have no idea of the purpose it serves and have no use for it.
Everyone expects Worcestershire Sauce bottles to come wrapped in
paper even though the reason for doing this has long disappeared.35
Tagines took a particular shape for functional reasons when they were
made of clay, and they retained this shape when made of aluminum
even though there was no longer a functional reason for doing so.36
Skeuomorphs can be found everywhere on the “desktops” of personal
computers.37
In short, the idea that a clause could be added to a contract and
remain there merely because everyone expected it to be there suggests
nothing special about either pari passu clauses in particular or contract
terms more generally. The same forces are at work as with ordinary
product attributes. Crafting legal prose is hard, and few contracts are
ever written from scratch. Lawyers almost always start with a template
taken from someplace else. For this reason, those who draft contracts
are likely to import features from earlier contracting environments,
even when they serve no purpose, merely because they are familiar. To
give another example involving financial instruments, the first railway
bonds were based on real estate mortgages. They still bear some of the
attributes of real estate mortgages, and not always for the better.38
We need to ask whether contract terms like pari passu clauses are
something more than one more example of a sort of imperfection
found across all the types of product attributes. One message at least

35. It was intended to minimize breakage during an era in which it was shipped by sea. See
About Us, LEA & PERRINS, http://www.leaperrins.com/History [https://perma.cc/5523-6V8Y].
36. See Georgina Russell, The Birth of Skeuomorph: A Terra Cotta Tajine and Its Aluminum
Counterpart, 3 J. MUSEUM ETHNOGRAPHY 113, 113–17 (1991).
37. As noted above, this sort of skeuomorph accounts for the only use of the word in the
legal literature. See Zachary Rosenberg, Returning to Plato’s Cave: Metadata’s Shadows in the
Courtroom, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439, 443 (2016) (“A skeuomorphic computer interface is designed
to emulate the physical world. . . . [T]he ‘desktop’ looks like the top of a desk, replete with
scattered files, folders, and a trashcan; word processors mimic typewriters by displaying what you
type on a representation of 8½ X 11 inch paper . . . .” (footnote omitted)); supra note 6.
38. This has led the analogy between foreclosure and reorganization to be pressed too hard.
See Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of
Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 804 n.76 (2017).
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implicit in much of the work on pari passu clauses is that their presence
in contracts unsettles the conventional understanding of contract law.
Black holes, after all, need to be taken seriously. They swallow
everything around them, destroy information, and are otherwise major
nuisances. But one needs to be careful to make sure that the metaphor
is not itself doing the heavy lifting.
Pari passu clauses illustrate how a useless contract term can
become part of a standard commercial transaction and remain in place
for a long time. Whether one uses the attention-getting, but somewhat
imprecise metaphor of “black holes,” or the more precise, but
decidedly more pedantic “skeuomorph,” one still needs to establish
how much the existence of this phenomenon requires us to reassess our
understanding of contracts.
Choi, Gulati, and Scott show that the presence of useless terms in
contracts can impose costs. But it is not clear how large these costs are.
They point to the municipal bond market as a place where we are likely
to find contract terms that are like pari passu clauses in sovereign debt
instruments.39 They are surely correct that many who acquire these
bonds have been woefully ill-informed about what will happen in the
unlikely event that a municipality files for bankruptcy. They know
nothing about what counts as a “special revenue” bond, even though
in Chapter 9 the difference between the holder of a special revenue
bond and the holder of an ordinary bond is the difference between a
secured and an unsecured creditor. In such an environment, it would
not be surprising if many of the terms in municipal bonds did not serve
their intended purpose or indeed any purpose at all.
But the rate of default on municipal bonds is extraordinarily low.
Once the risks—and therefore the costs—are high enough, the
dynamics change. Once a municipality is sufficiently distressed, rating
agencies and buyers begin to take note. Imperfections in contract
terms, like imperfect discrimination between goods of varying quality,
can persist only if they are not too costly.
In its latest long-term bond issue, the financially distressed
Chicago Public Schools system (CPS) went through enormous effort to
craft a bond that would be treated as a special revenue bond in a
Chapter 9 bankruptcy. More precisely, CPS went through enormous
effort to craft an instrument for which a law firm would write an
opinion letter stating that it would be treated as a special revenue bond.

39. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 71.
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The existence of the opinion letter drove the rating CPS was able to
secure for the bond from a rating agency and this in turn dramatically
lowered the interest it had to pay.40
Those at CPS who issued these bonds understood the way the
intricate definitional provisions of Chapter 9 operated better than any
law professor even though they were not themselves lawyers. The
characteristics of special revenue bonds is an obscure area at the
intersection between bankruptcy and municipal finance, but once the
prospect of default becomes large, the frictions that prevent the
migration towards more efficient terms become easier to overcome.
Legal terms that serve no function do present a challenge that
other similarly useless product attributes do not. In the case of an
ordinary skeuomorph, there is no need, other than academic curiosity,
to know why it is there. One can buy a maple syrup jar with a minuscule
and pointless handle without having to give it meaning or explain its
purpose. Legal terms are different. Judges must interpret contracts.
As a general matter, judges usually ask, in one way or another,
what a buyer and seller meant when they entered a particular contract,
even though in many cases, the buyer never even read the terms. The
inquiry is decidedly counterfactual. The buyer can have no intentions
with respect to terms that she never saw. It is useful, however, to
maintain this fiction when there are terms that marginal buyers may
have seen or that marginal buyers may have known about.
Skeuomorphs present a bigger problem. By definition, neither party
had any intention with respect to them. The judge is asked to interpret
words that the parties themselves did not understand.
It might seem sensible to treat contract terms that serve no
purpose simply as noise words. One could read the sovereign debt
contract as if the pari passu clause was not there. We do something
similar when trying to solve the battle of the forms. When parties enter
into a contract by exchanging forms that contain inconsistent
boilerplate, the conventional approach is to allow the conflicting terms
to knock each other out and to replace them with the default terms that
contract law supplies.41
There are difficulties with treating contractual skeuomorphs as

40. See Juan Perez Jr., Upcoming CPS Bond Issue Gets Favorable Outlook from Wall Street,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 9, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ctchicago-public-schools-bonds-met-20161208-story.html [https://perma.cc/FR5U-74DP].
41. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms:
A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1246–47 (1982).
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noise, however. First, it is hard to know whether a word is a
skeuomorph or whether it serves some purpose.42 It is still possible that
the term serves some purpose even if most parties use the term by rote
and have no idea what it means. Law firm associates might tinker with
pari passu clauses without knowing what they mean, but this does not
distinguish pari passu clauses from other clauses, and many of these do
matter. Law firm associates do much, indeed entirely too much, cutting
and pasting of terms without knowing what they mean.43
There are many product features that are useful even if the vast
majority of people who use them have no idea why they are there. The
caps to plastic ballpoint pens have holes in their tops for a reason.
Children and even some absent-minded adults chew on and then
accidently swallow them. The hole ensures that they will not suffocate.
It is a useful product feature that those who make a new plastic pen
might copy without knowing the function the hole served. It is a good
thing that such features persist. Even if someone makes a pen without
the hole, only that person’s buyer is worse off. Everyone else will still
follow the norm, even if they do not know why it makes sense to do so.
Just as people can copy useless features without knowing why, they can
copy beneficial ones as well.
A judge that dismisses a useful contract term as noise can cause
considerable mischief because she is doing more than someone who
copies a product feature whose useful purpose she does not
understand. A judge can extinguish valuable, but obscure contract
terms. If a judge mistakenly accepts a party’s argument that a contract
term is just a skeuomorph, she establishes a precedent that makes the
clause useless for others, even for the people who used it deliberately
and who understand how it affects the contract.
There is another reason for a judge to do her best to give contract
terms meaning even when their purpose is hard to discern. As soon as
judges treat obscure contract terms as meaningless, there is no pressure
42. Some have argued, for example, that ipso facto clauses, even though unenforceable, still
serve some purpose. See ZARFES & BLOOM, supra note 4, at 299–300.
43. For example, when a secured loan is paid off, law firm associates typically assemble the
required documentation, and this documentation provides for the termination statements
associated with the relevant UCC financing filings. Many associates assemble this paperwork
without understanding what the termination statement is doing. They never took secured
transactions and are simply following a checklist. But it can prove costly if they get it wrong. For
a case in which an associate ignored the advice of a paralegal and referenced the wrong
termination statement and caused a $1.5 billion loss, see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 755
F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014).
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for parties to change them. As soon as courts relieve parties of the fear
that keeping useless language in contracts might have consequences,
they will have less incentive to fix them. The battle-of-the-forms might
never have spawned the vast number of litigated disputes it did if courts
had been more willing to insist that language has consequences.
Courts do not need to pretend that they are trying to divine the
intentions of the parties when interpreting a contract. They listen to
advocates and do their best to capture what the words mean in the
relevant merchant community. They might end up doing something
that experts do not like, but experts are always free to get together (as
they did in the wake of the Argentinian debt case) and draft new
language. Judicial efforts to interpret language and give it some
meaning are likely to make contract drafters more cautious. Such an
interpretative strategy, of course, will prove costly in some instances,
but these costs give everyone an incentive to pay more attention to
their contracts or suffer the consequences. It is possible that Choi,
Gulati, and Scott’s exciting discovery, as valuable as it is, does not
require a shift in judicial interpretative strategies after all. Small brush
fires keep forests healthy. They burn away the undergrowth, add
nutrients to the soil, and make sure that large trees flourish.

